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Thomas Spence on Women’s Rights:
A Vindication
Rémy Duthille
1 Thomas Spence has long been recognized as one of the very few late-eighteenth-century
champions of women’s rights. E. P. Thompson noted that he “was one of the only Jacobin
propagandists to address his writing to working women themselves” in a 1797 pamphlet
whose significant title he gave in full: The Rights of Infants, or the Imprescriptable Right of
Mothers to Such Share of the Elements as Are Sufficient to Enable Them to Suckle and Bring Up
Their Young (Thompson 1963, 178). As H. T. Dickinson pointed out, Spence was one of the
very few who advocated women’s suffrage in the 1790s (Dickinson 1982, xiv; Dickinson
1994, 184‑185). The extent and sincerity of Spence’s feminism, however, was questioned
by several historians in the following decade, a process that culminated in 1992 with
David Worrall’s otherwise excellent Radical Culture: Discourse, Resistance, and Surveillance,
1790-1820. Worrall claimed that “Spence was, at best, an opportunist feminist” and that on
close reading his works displayed “a fairly anti-progressive picture within a revolutionary
setting” (Worrall 31).
2 Such  criticism,  this  article  will  argue,  is  unfair  and  unduly  stresses  Spence’s
shortcomings, which are assessed against the benchmark of a criticism of patriarchy that
he ought to have formulated. What matters, on the contrary, is his striking achievement
when compared to the anti-feminist arguments of many of his contemporaries, including
“radical” advocates of universal male suffrage. My contention is that Spence’s defence of
women’s rights was not a strategic ploy or an item he tacked onto his agenda; it was
integral to his political theory. To put the argument at its simplest: for Spence, women
enjoy natural rights (of a political and economic nature) because they are human beings;
from that basic premise there follow a number of arguments for equal rights. Though this
tendency is apparent in The Rights of Infants, it becomes more marked in Spence’s later
writings, which suggest that Spence had pondered over equality and revised his positions.
His utopian constitutions,  in particular,  contained provisions on women’s rights.  This
article, accordingly seeks to strike a fairer balance and therefore to vindicate Spence’s
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record on women’s rights in order to answer feminists’ charges that Spence was merely
reproducing a “patriarchal” pattern. This article will start by a critical survey on the
historiography that criticized Spence’s representation of women in The Rights of Infants.
The second section will broaden the perspective by discussing other works by Spence
because it is misguided to assume that The Rights of Infants contains Spence’s definitive
statement on women and their rights. This pamphlet, and others, raise the question of
women’s agency. To what extent did he conceive women as agents rather than as passive
beneficiaries of rights? How far does his commitment to gender equality translate into a
greater  share  of  political  activity?  The  final  section  will  examine  Spence’s
pronouncements  on  the  family,  marriage  and  divorce,  to  examine  his  alleged
maintenance of “patriarchy”.
 
The critical conversation on The Rights of Infants
3 In  the  1980s  and  1990s,  critics  searching  for  Spence’s  pronouncements  on  women
concentrated on The Rights of Infants.  This pamphlet, like many others by Spence, is a
charge  against  landlords  fattening  themselves  on  the  labour  of  their  tenants,  and  a
defense of a universal right of subsistence. In the preface, dated 19 March 1797, Spence
specifically attacked Thomas Paine, who had defended a measure of redistribution and
land reform in Agrarian Justice earlier in the year. 1 Spence bitterly arraigned Paine for
falling  short  of  advocating  his  own  land  plan:  while  Paine was  right  to  justify  the
principle of equal right to the land, his plan falls short of the people’s just claims: “The
poor, beggarly stipends which [Paine] would have us to accept of in lieu of our lordly and
just pretensions to the soil of our brith are so contemptible and insulting”. Spence knew
full well that the author of Rights of Man was a big name, that his pamphlet would sell and
therefore that his half-way measures would outshine Spence’s own “plan of enjoying
man’s right,  which [he had] been publishing in different ways for more than twenty
years” (Spence 1982, 47). The pamphlet proper is a dialogue between “Aristocracy” and
“Woman.” Woman advocates Spence’s land plan on the grounds that every “infant” has a
right to live:
Ask the she-bears, and every she-monster, and they will tell you what the rights of
every species of young are. – They will tell you, in resolute language and actions
too, that their rights extend to a full participation of the fruits of the earth. They
will tell you, and vindicate it likewise by deeds, that mothers have a right, at the
peril of all opposers, to provide from the elements the proper nourishments of their
young.” (48) 
4 This  right  involves  a  right  to  means  of  subsistence,  which  in  turn  entails  common
ownership of the land and universal dividends. Despite its title, then, the pamphlet is not
concerned  with  childhood  or  childcare  as  such,  but  rather  with  the  ultimate
consequences of the newborn’s right to subsistence. “Woman” is the children’s advocate
and, to Aristocracy’s “sneering” question: “And is your sex also set up for pleaders of
rights?” she proudly answers: “Yes, Molochs! Our sex were defenders of rights for the
beginning.” Since men, “like he-asses,” suffer to be imposed upon and bear oppression
without repining, then it is up to women to speak up for universal rights: “we, even we,
the females, will vindicate the rights of the species and throw you and all your panyers in
the  dirt”  (49).2 The second half  of  the  pamphlet  consists  in  “Woman”’s  impassioned
speech. She defiantly tells the aristocracy (“ladies and gentlemen”, “my good gentlefolk”)
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that the people are going to expropriate them and hand over the land to the parishes.
Women are to play the central role in the process:
We women (because the men are not to be depended on) will  appoint,  in every
parish, a committee of our sex (which we suppose our gallant lock-jawed spouses
and paramours will at least, for their own interest, not oppose) to receive the rents
of the houses, and lands already tenanted, and also to let, to the best bidders, on
seven years leases such farms and tenements as may, from time to time, become
vacant. (51) 
5 The rents will cover all the government’s expenses, and any surplus will be redistributed
to every man, woman and child in the community. “Woman” insists that “all this is done
for the sake of system, not revenge or retaliation” (52): the former landowners and the
rich will keep all their moveable property. Should they resist the appropriation of land,
however:
If, by foolish and wicked opposition, you should compel us, in our own defence, to
confiscate even your moveables, and perhaps also to cut you off, then let your blood
be upon your own heads, for we shall be guiltless. It will therefore be your interest
and  wisdom  to  submit  peaceably  and  fraternize  chearfully  with  us  as  fellow-
citizens. (52) 
6 This language harks back to the Terror and the sans-culotte argument that the aristocracy
must  be  exterminated  for  resisting  the  Revolution;  the  guillotine  is  the  condign
punishment of  those who refuse to  “fraternize”.  The use of  the word is  particularly
revealing as Spence includes women in such fraternization. Spence’s pamphlet ends in a
rejection of the “pretended philanthropy of the great” and a defense of “the rights of the
human species”: the final message is that the poor are entitled to justice and equality, not
charity (51, 53).
7 Barbara  Taylor  recognized  that  this  pamphlet  held  out  a  promise  “of  earthly  self-
fulfilment” that was extended to women. While acknowledging that in his utopian polity,
Spensonia, men and women would enjoy the same political rights, she insisted on the
exclusion  of  women  from  councils  owing  to  their  domestic  chores.  Moreover,  she
commented, “a woman’s marital status would in all respects […] be equal to that of her
husband.”  But  Taylor  adds  a  parenthesis  that  carries  the  weight  of  her  argument:
“(except apparently the domestic workload)” (Taylor 8).
8 David Worrall too set about “reading carefully through what Spence does and does not
say” (Worrall 31) and took him to task what what he did not say. He duly noted that in
Spence’s plan the surplus produce from the parishes “would be shared out exactly equally
whether male or female; married or single; legitimate or illegitimate; from a day old to
the  extremest  age”.  But  he  stressed  that  Spence  clung  to  a  patriarchal  model,  first
because parish dividends would be paid to the male head of each family, secondly because
The Rights of Infants is framed as a dialogue between “Aristocracy” and “Woman”, the
latter generic character defending the rights of women as mothers (not as human beings),
and presenting women as close to Nature and ultimately relegated to the care of children.
The economic and social dependency of women, then, would not change in Spensonia. In
Spence’s  eyes  women were only  useful  as  a  revolutionary vanguard,  and possibly  as
cannon fodder. While Spence “drew a quick political lesson from events like the women’s
march on Versailles in 1789” it is even unclear, for Worrall, whether Spence imagined
women would really act or whether he tried to shame men out of their political apathy
and into virile revolutionary action. Worrall, however, had to concede that “[p]erhaps
what is most important about Spence’s discussion of women is his ability to figure their
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agency at all” (31-32). Anna Clark expanded the argument and suggested that by taking
on a female persona in The Rights of Infants, Spence tried to shame and goad men into
action (Clark 1999, 149). As will be argued later, imagining female agency and adopting a
woman’s voice (however generic) was a crucial achievement which in itself makes it very
difficult to portray Spence as an unqualified upholder of the patriarchal status quo.
9 Malcolm Chase adopted a more nuanced approach, underlining that Spence’s position
changed over time. While women were not mentioned in his 1775 lecture, The Rights of
Infants was  seen as  a  turning point  because this  pamphlet  brought  out  a  defence of
women’s  full  political  rights.  Chase  perceived  in  the  1797  pamphlet  “the  germ of  a
concept of male oppression, and an admission that masculine brutishness and turpitude
lay at the root of inequality.” He also noted close affinities between Spence’s ideal of
equality  between the  sexes  and that  of  (unnamed)  seventeenth-century  radicals,  but
wisely refrained from inferring a direct “influence.”3
10 Judgments have become more positive recently. In 2011, Jon Mee, referring to The Rights
of Infants, argued that female equality was “a cause treated more positively in the popular
radical movement than is sometimes allowed” (Mee 126). Mee’s was a remark in a general
discussion of popular radical culture, and it was not elaborated on: this begs the question
of how positively women’s rights are treated by Spence. As for Arianne Chernock, she
recognized that Spence’s essentialist argument presenting men as mothers (in Rousseau’s
sense) is “problematic” but noted that his vision of the positive transforming potential of
women’s feminine sensibility was in itself crucial and significant in the reform movement
of the times (Chernock 122‑123). She enlisted him among the “radicals who, if they did
not make feminism a priority, at least supported women’s rights (Chernock 4).”
11 Chernock’s judgment is valid to a certain extent. Spence was not a feminist indeed, in the
sense that he did not make women’s liberation a priority and that he did not think gender
difference  was  the  root  of  oppression  (the  fundamental  cause  of  oppression  and
inequality,  both  economic  and  political,  was  private  ownership  of  land).  Chernock,
however, retains much of Barbara Taylor’s scepticism about Spence’s ulterior motives
and  suggests  that  he  may  have  been  uncomfortable  with  the  idea  of  enfranchising
conservative women or those who might be influenced by their husbands.
12 Supposing the pamphlet to be a piece of opportunistic propaganda, then why should it
reveal what Spence really thought about women? He presents “Woman” as a mother and a
wife. It does not follow that he thought that motherhood was the essence of womanhood,
or that all Englishwomen were wives and mothers. He knew very well that was not the
case: the pamphlet contains the phrase “men or female; married or single” (Spence 1982,
51). Rather, it suggests that Spence found it politically expedient to appeal to maternal
instinct and the defence of children. It should be noted here that some Frenchwomen did
justify  their  revolutionary  commitment  by  their  role  as  mothers,  but  according  to
Dominique Godineau, who undertook a systematic survey of Parisian women’s political
activities during the Revolution, this was not the dominant rationale, and though all the
lower-class women of Paris were housewives and were vitally affected by the issue of
subsistence, this issue was not central to the struggle of the more politically conscious
women (Godineau 1989; Godineau 1988, 352). Spence, then, was not mimicking the actual
discourse  of  Parisian  revolutionary  women.  The  context  of  the  war  may  offer  an
explanation for his  focus on motherhood.  Women’s role as child-bearers was exalted
during the war “when the size and health of the population was a particularly significant
issue”  (Macleod  28),  both  in  France,  with  the  concept  of  “republican  motherhood”
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(Landes 129‑138) and in Britain,  in the loyalist  propaganda and in the highly visible
contribution of women to the war effort, through charity work and activities such as
knitting and sewing for soldiers, which tied in nicely with their roles as mothers and
housewives  (Colley  250‑262).  Since  female  support  for  the  war  was  publicized,  for
instance in the form of addresses or subscription lists in the newspapers, Spence could
not have been unaware of  it.  His pamphlet,  in that context,  may be explained as an
attempt to reclaim women’s maternal role for his own purposes, against conservative
appropriations of it.
13 Chernock’s contention that Spence had a “reductive understanding of woman as a figure
naturally sympathetic to revolution” leads her to wonder “whether Spence himself would
have supported those women who did not exhibit “revolutionary” sentiments”, women
like  the  conservative  controversialist  Hannah More  (124).  This  argument  proves  too
much: if Spence was not ready to enfranchise conservative women, then why would he
support male universal suffrage in the first place? He knew full well that many men were
loyalists,  and  yet  he  fought  for  the  enfranchisement  of  all  men,  including  loyalists.
Spence did portray women as “naturally sympathetic to revolution” (Chernock 124) but it
does not necessarily follow that he believed that all women, in 1797, were ready to engage
in revolutionary action. A more likely interpretation is that he believed that women, like
men, could be educated and might become aware of their true interests, which were best
defended in his land plan.
14 How opportunistic was the pamphlet, then? Interpretation is delicate. We cannot probe
Spence’s heart, and part of the argument depends on the pamphlet’s implied audience
and what Spence thought about it.  Did he calculate that there was a constituency of
women that he could win over to this cause by specifically feminist arguments? This
might have been the case, but it doesn’t imply he was insincere, especially because the
argument  that  women  must  have  the  vote  on  account  of  their  children  appears
elsewhere, in pamphlets that do not specifically target women, but have a male implicit
reader. If his feminist proposals were opportunistic, then he should have dropped them
when addressing men, who were presumably the majority of his audience and certainly
his implied readers. Given the prevalence of “rough” types of masculinity in his plebeian
environment, the rhetoric of manly superiority pandering to misogynistic or patronizing
attitudes  would  have  made more  strategic  sense.  Plebeian clubs,  including Spencean
clubs, were ruled by an artisan masculine ethos that incorporated elements of aggressive
virility which could degenerate into drinking contests,  brawls and violent behaviour.
Members of  the  plebeian  societies  and  followers  of  Spence  were  thus  viewed  as
“unrespectable”  by  the  authorities  and  the  loyalists.  Spence  certainly  rejected  his
opponents’ polished, urbane, Addisonian ideal of the “independent gentleman”, pouring
scorn on “our now-a-days so much boasted gentlemen of independent fortunes”.4 On the
face of it, Spence’s plebeian, rough masculine environment was no natural constituency
of feminism, and argument addressing supposedly feminist sensibilities in such a social
milieu seem doomed to failure. This leaves us with the hypothesis that Spence included
provisions for women in his constitutional plans to appeal to women. This would mean he
was addressing a mixed audience, writing to men and women, which is in itself significant
and sets him apart from other radical writers of the time who wrote for males only.
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Women’s agency and women’s rights in Spence’s
writings
15 Whatever ulterior motives Spence might have had, The Rights of Infants is significant as a
speech act. Spence’s “Woman” is not a female allegory of Britannia, the republic, liberty
or anything else. In his prosopopoeia this male writer adopted a female persona to make a
serious political argument. This seems to be unique in the abundant literature of the
1790s.  Inventing a credible popular voice to achieve a potent “vernacular voice” was
notoriously difficult for radicals and anti-Jacobins as well.(Gilmartin 19‑54) Hannah More,
who is sometimes seen as a feminist, staged dialogues between male characters. Even
Wollstonecraft addressed middle-class women and did not try to impersonate labouring
women.
16 As Worrall  noted,  the question of  women’s  agency is  central  in The Rights  of  Infants.
Examples  of  Frenchwomen’s  activism  during  the  Revolution,  such  as  the  march  to
Versailles on 5-6 October 1789, must have inspired Spence. He is exceptionally favourable
to poor women’s political agency in The Rights of Infants when compared to Burke and even
Wollstonecraft.  Edmund Burke’s evocation of the royal family’s return to Paris under
watchful escort on 6 October 1789 has remained famous: “the royal captives who followed
in the train were slowly moved along, amidst the horrid yells, and shrilling screams, and
frantic dances, and infamous contumelies, and all the unutterable abominations of the
furies of hell in the abused shape of the vilest of women” (Burke 63). As critics have
noted, though Mary Wollstonecraft had dismissed this passage in her Vindications of the
Rights of Men in 1790, in her Historical and Moral of the French Revolution she depicted the
Parisian working women in pejorative terms that were reminiscent of Burke’s harpies:
“the lowest refuse of the streets,  women who had thrown off the virtues of own sex
without having power to assume more than the vices of the other”.5 In Spence’s Rights of
Infants, on the contrary, “Woman” seems to have retained “female” maternal sensibility
and taken on “manly” fortitude, sturdiness and courage. In stark contrast with Burke’s
and  Wollstonecraft’s  degrading  representations  Spence  exalts  a  politically-conscious,
vocal and respectable lower-class woman who stands up for her own and her family’s
rights. “Woman”’s opening invocation of “the she-bears, and every she-monster” might
be read as a rejection of social stigma, of stereotypical opprobrium, and as a defence of
lower-class women’s dignity.
17 Spence’s sympathy for lower-class women must have originated in his own experience of
poverty which, as he himself declared, had awakened his sense of injustice. His childhood
was spent in miserably poor circumstances in Newcastle; his mother, Margaret Flet, a
native  of  the  Orkneys,  “was  an  industrious  woman,  and kept  a  stall  for  the  sale  of
stockings” (Rudkin 15). Spence knew what working hard and struggling for subsistence
meant. He might also have been aware that women played political roles at a local level:
in the late eighteenth century some women ratepayers attended vestry meetings and had
the right to vote on matters directly affecting the community (Eastwood 47).  Further
research is needed to determine whether this was the case in Newcastle and whether
Spence could have been aware of it.  It may be supposed, however, that he had some
knowledge  of  women’s  political  involvement  in  Newcastle.  From 1769  on  a  wave  of
Wilkite  agitation  gathered  momentum;  national  grievances,  in  the  context  of  the
incipient American War, and the dispute around the Town Moor coalesced in 1775 and a
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radical opposition set the tone of politics until well into the 1780s. In 1782 a group of
women  “proposed  forming  a  ‘patriotic  association  in  defence  of  their  liberties’  and
addressing the queen” in support for a motion to end the war (Wilson 426).
18 Spence looked beyond his  own immediate  experience for  other  examples  of  popular
agency. In Pig’s Meat he published long extracts from “The History of the Rise and Fall of
Masaniello.” Masaniello was a fisherman who had led a revolt in Naples in 1647 (Spence
1794, III.22-55, 67-98, 123-136).6 The participation of women is noted several times in this
account, but their behaviour is not praised as such and at times it can also be understood
as  evidence  of  the  fickleness  of  public  opinion.  Significantly  Masaniello’s  revolt  was
sparked off by a new tax on food. Spence must have known that women were particularly
active in food riots. Women’s closeness to nature and maternal nature is not essential to
his argument on the right to the fruits of the earth; rather Spence must have appealed to
popular notions of justice, what E. P. Thompson famously called “the moral economy of
the English crowd.”7 Spence’s political consciousness was first stirred during the
controversy over the enclosure of the Newcastle town moor. Several provisions in his
projects  of  constitutions  such  as  The  Constitution  of  Spensonia (1803)  address  popular
grievances with legislation on hunting and against the engrossing and forestalling of corn
(Art.39, 40, 42, in Spence 1982, 109-110).
19 How is the issue of women’s agency and political rights treated elsewhere in Spence?
David Worrall finds that “[r]eferences to women are infrequent” in Spence’s works apart
from The Rights of Infants (Worrall 31). But Spence does mention women very frequently
indeed compared to his contemporaries Price, Priestley, Paine, or Cartwright—or to the
French,  American,  or  (unwritten)  British  constitutions  of  his  times,  or  ours  for  that
matter.  The  civic  humanist  tradition  emphasized  the  necessity  of  virtue,  an
etymologically  manly  quality.  In  the  eighteenth  century  the  idea  gained  hold  that
women’s  and  man’s  virtues  were  essentially  different  and  incompatible  (on  the
complexity  of  French conceptions  of  vertu,  see  Linton 2001).  There  is  a  misogynistic
streak  in  much republican  writing  which  saw any  woman’s  political  involvement  as
morally and politically dangerous. This is especially true in the writings of some English
Commonwealthmen, such as James Burgh, whose Political Disquisitions (1774-1776) warn
against  the  effeminizing  influence  of  women,  the  deleterious  advice  giving  by  royal
favourites  such  as  Charles  II’s  mistresses  or  the  marquise  de  Pompadour  in  France.
Attacks on effeminacy mediated anxieties about rivalry with France, imperial concerns
and alleged aristocratic corruption.8 John Wilkes’s libertinism and homophobia were also
a  consequence  of  the  gendered  construction  of  the  opposition  between  the  manly
independent elector and the effete courtier (McCormack 86‑92; Clark 1998). Positions on
women’s political rights, then, did not always tally with conventional divisions between
radical and conservative. Edmund Burke admitted that educated women were part of the
British public whose views constituted a real public opinion that should be heeded by
legislators.  John Thelwall,  a  self-proclaimed Jacobin and an ardent  defender  of  male
universal  suffrage,  ridiculed  Burke’s  suggestion,  reducing  it  to  a  preux  chevalier’s
unguarded expression of  gallantry (Thelwall  397).  It  is  in France that  the misogynist
nature  of  republican  ideology  was  most  visible,  because  the  French  revolutionaries
refused to grant citizenship to women. It has been argued that the ancien régime public
sphere, which tolerated and even accommodated the political expression of at least some
aristocratic women in salons, was more open to women than the new republican public
sphere which emerged out of the French Revolution. Joan Landes claimed that the public
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sphere was reconstructed along masculinist lines, not just without women, but against
them (Landes).
20 Spence seems to be indebted to the civic humanist tradition inasmuch as he repeatedly
insisted that  all  men should actively participate in political  life  as  both citizens and
soldiers.  In  his  earlier  work he  depicted scenes  involving men and boys  engaged in
military  exercises  on  the  parish  common  while  old  men,  women  and  children  sat
watching them:
And now you shall witness with your own eyes that force is as unlikely to succeed
against us as your secret corruption. Therefore you must go with me to-morrow to
a neighbouring parish about two miles off, it being their general review day, when
all the men thereof are to go through their military exercise. Every parish has a
general field day once in a quarter of a year appointed by act of parliament […].
Accordingly when next morning came, which was exceedingly fine, we went to the
military ground of the aforesaid parish, which was very neat and convenient and
tolerably large, surrounded with several rows of trees, with seats underneath for
the spectators and kept entirely for that and such like public uses. The parish bells
rung merrily, numbers of spectators from the neighbouring parishes, with all the
old men, women, and children that could get from the same parish were solacing
themselves in the morning sun around the place. Presently the men of the parish
appeared,  those who had good horses on horseback,  those of a colour together,
others trailing field-pieces of brass, and others with muskets. The boys too were
classed according to their sizes, with small muskets and cannon suitable to their
strength, and the whole with proper officers, colours, music, and an uniform dress,
which last was peculiar to the parish […]. They made a gallant appearance and all in
their most happy countenances, as if going to some agreeable sport.9
21 In this idyllic setting women and girls, together with the elderly, are literally watching
the martial show from the sidelines. The utopian scene appears decidedly conservative
here, replicating the gendered categories of eighteenth-century England, and even the
social distinctions which were visible in militia musters through the distinction between
the affluent men on horseback and the rank-and-file walking behind them. This scene
would not be amiss in a loyalist description of a perfect English village attending the
militia’s drilling at the time of the American War or the French Wars.
22 Such neatly gendered utopian scenes are absent from his later work. Spence’s thought
developed in the direction of gender equality.  Women are not mentioned in his 1775
lecture to the Newcastle Philosophical Society, published as “The Real Rights of Man”
(Spence 1982, 1‑5). Recently a copy of the original version of the lecture, long thought to
be lost, was found; it revealed that the original title was “Property in Land Every One’s Right
”.  Alastair  Bonnett  cautiously  comments  that  “[g]iven Spence’s  limited  but  steadfast
support  for  female  suffrage  (he  supported  it  at  the  parish  level  but  opposed at  the
national level) the gender neutrality of the title may or may not have been deliberate”
(Bonnett 135). This caution is commendable: Spence used gender-neutral pronouns later
in his career, and in 1775 he had hardly begun his research in the English language. But
Spence may have been aware of the issue of women’s rights. The 1793 edition of the
lecture was accompanied by “Queries sent to the Philosophical Society, in Newcastle, on
the  26th of  December,  1775,  by  the  Rev.  Mr.  J.  Murray,  on  account  of  Mr.  Spence’s
expulsion”. The fourteenth query reads: “Is it implied in the nature of the social compact,
that the one half of the contractors should have no right of possessions?” (Spence 1793,
33) This query suggests that by 1775 Spence had drawn the egalitarian implications of the
social contract: if men’s property was guaranteed by the social contract why should not
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women’s  property  guaranteed  as  well  since  men  and  women  were  equally  rational
creatures and co-contractors?
23 Spence  explicitly  defended  women’s  rights  only  later.  In  The  Constitution  of  a  Perfect
Commonwealth (1798), he distinguished between “local” and “proprietory” citizens. While
only men (“every man”) enjoyed the voting rights of local citizens, “[e]very man, woman,
and child is a proprietary citizen in the parish or district in which they have acquired the
title  of  local  citizen,  either  on account  of  their  own residence,  if  adults,  or  of  their
parents, if infants.” Women and children, as well as men, enjoy economic rights in the
form of a share of the revenue of the parish (Spence 1982, 61‑62).10 By that time, however,
Spence was already considering that women could deliberate and vote, since the women
in The Rights of Infants threaten with “appoint[ing], in every parish, a committee of our
own sex” and are ready to do the business of the parish that is neglected by men.
24 In The Constitution of Spensonia (1803), he defended votes for women, and therefore a fully
universal adult suffrage (Spence 1982, 104-118). A striking feature of the declaration of
rights at the beginning of the book is its floating semantics. Spence seems to be groping
his  way  toward  a  gender-neutral  vocabulary.  Some  articles,  relative  to  judiciary
guarantees especially, have “every man” or “a man” (art.13, 16), echoing the phraseology
of the English common law. Article 16 reads: “Every man being supposed innocent until
he has been declared guilty, if it is judged indispensable to arrest him all severity not
necessary to secure his person ought to be be strictly repressed by the law.” There are
also negative clauses based on articles of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, as
in article 22: “no one can be deprived of the smallest portion of his property without his
consent, except when the public necessity, legally ascertained, evidently require it, and
on condition of a just and previous indemnification.” Article 13 reads: “No person can be
accused, arrested, or confined but in cases determined by the law, and according to the
form which it prescribes. Every citizen summoned or seized by the authority of the law
ought immediately to obey, he renders himself culpable by resistance” (art.13). Finally,
Spence uses indeterminate, gender-neutral words such as “every individual” (art.34) or
“those who…” (art.15): “The right of presenting petitions to the depositories of public
authority belongs to every individual” (art.34). The first article, which stated that “all
men are equal by nature and before the law”, was reworded to read “all human beings.”
This disparate, changing vocabulary suggests that Spence’s thinking was still in flux as he
was working his plan out and moving toward gender equality.
25 Spence fell short of advocating absolute equality, however, as article 5 testifies:
Female citizens have the same right of suffrage in their respective parishes as the
men: because they have equal property in the country and are equally subject to
the law and, indeed, they are in every respect, as well on their own account as on
account of their children, as deeply interested in every public transaction. But in
consideration  of  the  delicacy  of  their  sex,  they  are  exempted  from,  and  are
ineligible to, all public employments.” (Spence 1982, 107)
26 Justifications for women’s suffrage here seem to stem partly from a democratic version of
the neo-Harringtonian idea that land ownership confers political rights;11 partly from a
more general argument that every person concerned with public affairs ought to have the
vote. In The Constitution of Spensonia, everyone, including women, children, and criminals,
enjoy “a share of the parish revenue” (105). Each person enjoys this right because they
belong to humankind. In later editions of the pamphlet, Spence wrote that “all human
beings are equal by nature and before the law, and have a continual and inalienable
property in the earth, and its natural productions” (104). If the vote derives from landed
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property and landed property is a right of every human being, then ultimately women are
entitled to the vote as adult human beings.
27 The object of article 5 was not to grant full equality, but on the contrary to differentiate
between men and women. It sounds as if children were virtually represented by their
mothers and not by their fathers—as if, therefore, women were even more entitled than
men to have the vote. This extra justification for women’s votes is in contrast with their
exclusion from public employments. Spence’s consideration for “the delicacy of their sex”
can easily be dismissed as a supremely sexist and patronizing instance of false gallantry.
Mary  Wollstonecraft  already  ranked  “delicacy  of  sentiment”  among  “those  pretty
feminine phrases, which the men condescendingly use to soften our slavish dependence”
(Wollstonecraft 82).  Wollstonecraft’s claim can be substantiated by many examples of
French legislators justifying women’s exclusion from the suffrage and a differentiated
education for girl by considerations on women’s delicate constitutions and their natural
vocation for marriage and household management.  A shining exception is Condorcet,
who defended women’s suffrage and demolished such arguments as early as July 1790; in
the Convention only Gilbert Romme and Pierre Guyomar proposed enfranchising women
(Fauré; Condorcet; Duhet 184‑188 on Mirabeau and Talleyrand’s stance against women).
28 Spence’s use of “delicacy” was similar to that of French legislators who naturalized the
difference between men and women. This is impossible to vindicate, even in Spence’s own
system of thought. Women, he writes, are “exempted.” In his 1755 Dictionary of the English
Language Samuel Johnson defined “exemption” as “immunity, privilege, freedom from
imposts or burdensome employments.” This concept sits uneasily with Spence’s general
rejection of privileges. One argument however may somehow mitigate our judgment. In
Spence’s polity, women have voting rights at the parish level, where the literally vital
questions  of  subsistence  and  everyday  life  would  be  debated  and  solved.  Executive
functions are derivative and burdensome. Ideally they are confined to mere execution
with no space for personal (and potentially arbitrary) interpretation. Spence had no truck
for a strong government devising policies and pushing them through the medium of a
parliament and local agencies. In his utopian polities the reality of power is lodged with
the  parish  councils,  not  with  male  law-enforcement  officers  or  even  the  central
government.12 Giving the vote to women in the parish councils and excluding them from
executive functions did not mean confining them to the lowest political  echelon, but
ensuring they had a say in the assembly that legislated for the community’s fundamental
concerns.
 
Spence on marriage and the family
29 A final argument that must be confronted is the notion that Spence’s utopia would leave
women’s subordinate position in a patriarchal society essentially unchanged. It should be
noted, however, that “patriarchy” did not entail the subjection of women only. As Ann
Hughes wrote in a recent study of the English Revolution of the 1640s:
Early modern England is sometimes described, in short-hand form, as a patriarchal
society,  where patriarchy is  understood as the domination of men over women.
Patriarchy should, however, be defined more specifically as a form of power based
on fatherhood, giving some men authority over children, younger and poorer men,
as well as over women. It was by no means a system that benefited all men. (Hughes
19)
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30 Many men – those who never married (up to a fifth of the male population) and the poor
– never achieved the ideal of “self-sufficiency seen as crucial to manhood” (19). 
31 Spence defended one aspect of “patriarchy” as defined above: he saw marriage as the
natural wish of every girl—and boy. If women are condemned to the marital state in his
utopia, so are men. Arguably, this leaves Spence’s utopias vulnerable to a queer critique
of heteronormativity even more than to a feminist critique. In The Constitution of a Perfect
Commonwealth (1798) Spence argued that the current system of private property not only
compromised the wellbeing and happiness of  individuals of both sexes,  but degraded
their morals, in all social classes. He deploys the language of sensibility to denounce the
ills begotten by marriages of convenience:
Does not the pride and etiquette of birth and family act the inexorable tyrant over
their  most  tender  feelings,  destroy  love  and  friendship,  and  even  dissolve  the
brotherly ties of blood by unnaturally erecting one in every brood of children into a
lordly tyrant over the rest? (Spence 1982, 55)
32 The perpetrators of such a system were also its victims. They were turned into “unnatural
monsters.” The children of “the labouring class” did not fare better: they were brought
up to become “whores and soldiers” (56). One of the arguments in favour of his plan is
that it would “be a great improvement in the morals of this class.” In particular, a parish
dividend  of  £ 10  a  year  per  person  would  teach  young  unmarried  women  habits  of
household economy. They would be encouraged to “become notable housewives, as the
prospect of marriage, in such a land of bliss, would soon open to their views.” Spence
waxes lyrical on the blessings of conjugal love: “The whole horizon of love will glow with
felicity, no more to be clouded with ill-boding and gloomy apprehension” (56).
33 This  vision was  “patriarchal”  to  the  extent  that  Spence  saw the  family  as  the  basic
structure and the male as head of the household. But he certainly wished to eradicate
negative aspects of the patriarchal model outlined by Hughes: to end the poorer and
younger men’s dependency on older and richer men, and to redress the balance of power
in  the  married  couple.  He  collapsed  the  difference  between  legitimate  children  and
bastards, stating in 1803 that everybody had an equal claim to a share of the rent, “every
man, woman, child, whether born in wedlock or not (for nature and justice know nothing
of illegitimacy).” His ideal constitution had a provision for “every widow or unmarried
woman or woman separated from her husband.”13 Here as on many other issues, Spence
remains frustratingly laconic. He insists on removing the stigma attached to bastards:
children born out of wedlock and their mothers should be treated respectfully, like any
other  individual.  In  a  British  context  this  was  very progressive,  considering  the
humiliating treatment single mothers and their children were subjected to when they
claimed relief.
34 To assess the significance of Spence’s commitment to equality and women’s rights it is
useful to stress that he insists on rights but does not dwell on the specific problems of
those women and children and especially on the problem of the father’s acknowledgment
of his children. In this he adheres to the spirit of the French legislators but ignores issues
that were treated by Olympe de Gouges. The idea that “nature and justice know nothing
of illegitimacy” was the rationale for major reforms in family and inheritance law during
the French Revolution. The abolition of privileges (4 August 1789) had paved the way to
the equal treatment of all children, the abolition of primogeniture and the equal sharing
of inheritance among all children, including daughters. The law of 12 brumaire an II (2
November 1793) guaranteed that natural  children who were legally acknowledged by
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their father would enjoy the same inheritance rights as legitimate children.14 In practice,
however, French law tolerated the continuance of discriminatory practices and not all
“bastards” benefited from the new clauses, if only because fathers could not be forced to
acknowledge their children. Article XI of Olympe de Gouges’s Declaration of the Rights of
Woman and the Female Citizen (1791) states that: “The free communication of thoughts and
opinions is  one of  the most precious rights of  woman,  since that  liberty assures the
recognition of children by their fathers. Any female citizen thus may say freely, I am the
mother of a child which belongs to you, without being forced by a barbarous prejudice to
hide  the  truth”  (Levy,  Applewhite,  &  Johnson  91).  Sexual  liberty  (though  not
licentiousness) is as a corollary to liberty of speech: a woman must have the right to name
her child’s father.  Gouges added that a married man’s bastard is deprived of his/her
inheritance by “barbaric laws”. She proposes a “social contract” whereby “our property
belongs directly to our children,  from whatever bed they come,  and [...]  all  of  them
without distinction have the right to bear the name of their fathers and mothers who
have acknowledged them” (94;  see also Duhet,  71-4).  The last  clause is  essential:  the
parents  must  acknowledge the  child.  The  emphasis  is  strikingly  different  in  Spence.
Whereas Gouges insists on the woman’s sexual freedom and the man’s responsibility to
acknowledge the child, in order to safeguard the child’s inheritance, Spence adopts a
male point of view: he argues that unmarried mothers should not bear a stigma and
should enjoy equal rights, but does not suggest that the father has a duty to acknowledge
the child. Contrary to Gouges he is not concerned with inheritance, presumably because
all individuals are provided with a basic subsistence income in his land plan.
35 In his defence of divorce, he endeavours to adopt the point of view of both men and
women; his argument rests on equality between the spouses and on the right of women,
as well  as men, to initiate divorce proceedings.  While he may have been indebted to
Milton  or  others,  he  kept  abreast  of  the  news  and  his  apology  of  divorce,  in  1800,
contributed to ongoing debates. A bill which “would have made adultery a crime for the
first time since Cromwell” failed in the British Parliament.15 Spence praised the “facility
of divorce which the French now allow” (Spence, The Political Works of Thomas Spence 76). 
The  French  law on  divorce  was  predicated  on  a  the  idea  that  marriage  was  a  civil
contract:  this  secularized  vision  of  marriage  had  long  been  brooding  in  the  French
Enlightenment – Montesquieu and Diderot shared it, among others – but it was enshrined
only in 1791, in article 7 of the new Constitution: “The law recognizes marriage only as a
civil contract” (Dessertine 208). The law of 20 September 1792 made the dissolution of
marriage possible by mutual consent, on the basis of a simple assertion by one of the
spouses,  of  any  of  seven  possible  motives,  including  dementia,  physical  abuse,
abandonment for more than two years, absence for more than five years, or “déréglement
notoire des mœurs” (adultery). There had been much agitation in favour of the divorce
law, and on 1 April 1792 the Legislative Assembly had admitted a delegation of women
who claimed the right to divorce (Ronsin 321).  Though Spence did not  spell  out  the
justified causes for divorce in so much detail, he clearly accepted some provisions of the
French law (on dementia, physical abuse and adultery):
[U]nder our unalterable establishment what a dreadful thing it is to make a wrong
choice where there is  no remedy nor redress for life.  It  is  enough to make one
shudder  to  think  of  being  indissolubly  bound  to  a  spendthrift,  a  drunkard,  a
sluggard, a tyrant, a brute, a trollop, a vixen. What signifies reforms of government
or redress of public grievances,  if  people cannot have their domestic grievances
redressed? (76) 
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36 Spence recognized that an Englishman’s home should not be his castle, and that domestic
despotism or marital strife, whether the fault lay with the husband or the wife, was
unacceptable. He suggested that marriage should be founded on love. Adopting a male
point of view, he argued that divorce would give every man a fair chance of achieving
love with his loved one:
The matrimonial couples need not always now be chiding each other to no purpose
about misconduct, for as they know they can part so easily they must if they wish to
continue together study to make each other happy by sobriety, industry, civility,
etc.  Gross  faults  will  not  always  be  borne  with  now  by  either  side  therefore
disgraceful bickerings will cease and the nuptial state will become like a continual
courtship, because a good husband or good wife will be valued, and used as they
deserve through fear of being lost.
[…] Another good effect must also flow from such known possibility of separation.
Men will no longer be afraid to give a beloved woman a fair trial of domestic life,
though formerly she may have borne but a loose character, by which many will be
reclaimed, the number of single women lessened, and the state of society much
mended. (76)
37 He adhered to an ideal of marital bliss that unfortunately he could not achieve in his own
marriage. Olive Rudkin wrote that “[m]arriage did not bring happiness to Spence. He was
“unfortunate”  in  his  choice  of  a  [first]  wife.”  His  second  wife  was  described  as  a
“termagant” (Rudkin 24, 89). In the passage marriage appears as an ideal that everybody
should strive for : even women “of loose character” and, possibly, prostitutes, can be
“reclaimed”. The condition of “single women” is not an enviable one, even in Spence’s
ideal utopia. Such a passage shows that Spence was indebted to a moral ethos of family
life and domestic virtue.
38 Thomas  Spence  does  not  qualify  as  a  feminist  according  to  late-20th  or  early-21th-
century standards. But why should he ? It would anachronistic to dismiss his advanced
views  or  his  failure  to  develop  a  full  critique  of  patriarchy  by  holding  him  to  our
standards, without remembering that he wrote on many social and economic issues, some
pertaining to women specifically, that were entirely neglected by other reformers of his
time (and later).  His defence of women’s suffrage was predicated on the fundamental
equality of all human beings, although a gendered notion of republican virtue and female
“delicacy”  remained present  and limited their  active  political  participation.  Spence’s
position, however, changed and he paid increasing attention to gender equality. Perhaps
he could have been convinced in time that women could hold political office.
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NOTES
1. In Agrarian Justice, Paine, though less committed to economic egalitarianism than Spence was,
nevertheless went far beyond anything he had written before. (Claeys 196‑208) Claeys says little
of Spence’s criticism of Paine. For a more thorough comparison, see Marangos. 
2. “Panyer”: basket (from the French panier). But this might be a derisive reference to servants:
the Oxford English Dictionary defines “pannier” as “pair of frames of whalebone, cane, etc., used to
expand the skirt of a woman’s dress at the hips”, and quotes an occurrence from 1739 ironically
alluding to the “practice of having manservants dressed in elaborate uniforms and referring to
the use of additional material pleated into the skirts of a man's coat and stiffened to make it fan
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out  at  the  sides.”  "pannier,  n.1."  OED  Online.  Oxford  University  Press,  March 2015.  <https://
www.oed.com> 27 May 2015.
3. John Milton and Gerrard Winstanley, both anthologized in Spence’s periodical Pig’s Meat, are
possible candidates. Milton famously defended divorce. As for Winstanley, he considered that the
law should defend women and prohibit physical abuse, but his view of women was distinctly
patriarchal (Bowman 401; Gurney 91‑92; Gheeraert-Graffeuille 33‑34).
4. Spence 1982,  37.  On issues of  respectability and the roughness of  the “ultra-radicals”,  see
McCalman; Davis and Pickering, and especially Davis. For more general discussions of Georgian
masculinity, see Cohen 1996; McCormack.
5. Blakemore 133-138;  Linton  2013,  408;  on  the  ambivalent  representation  of  the  women
participants of the October Day, see also Landes 109-112.
6. Mixed crowds of rioters, including women specifically, are mentioned pp.68 and 81. But the
“tears [...] of an infinite multitude of women” at Masaniello's funeral are seen as “the effect of a
popular inconstancy which is not to be equaled” (211).
7. Thompson 1971. See p.116, and Dickinson 1994, 147 on women as instigators of bread riots. On
major food riots with women’s involvement in Newcastle in 1740, see Randall 100‑102.
8. On “effeminacy” as “a category of meanings expressing anxiety about the effect women – or
the feminine – on the one hand, and desire, on the other, might have on the gentleman”, see
Cohen 1996, 7; Cohen 1999. On the nexus linking gender, politics and empire, see Wilson 178-205. 
9. A Supplement to the History of Robinson Crusoe… (1782) in Spence 1982, 9.
10. Article 5 deprives women of local citizenship, but article 6 makes them proprietary citizens
because they are local citizens (on the basis of their residence).
11. On neo-Harringtonianism, see Pocock. However, Spence was no mere disciple of Harrington
and he considerably altered Harrington’s framework (Lee; Duthille)
12. He insists that public employments are “duties,” not “distinctions” or “rewards”, in keeping
with civic humanist criticism of corruption, sinecures, places and pensions. (Spence 1982, 59, 61)
13. Spence 1982, 107. See also in The Constitution of a Perfect Commonwealth, the division of the
parish surplus among the “inhabitants of every description, and whether they be men, women or
children, legitimate or illegitimate” (55).
14. On the abolition of bâtardise and the restoration of some of its principles by Napoleon in 1804,
see: Schnapper; Bloquet.
15. On  the  Adultery  Prevention  Bill  and  the  Bill  for  the  Punishment  and  more  effectual
prevention of the Crime of Adultery, see Cobbett’s  Parliamentary History,  vol.35, co.225-308 and
Phillips 125.
ABSTRACTS
Thomas Spence, a defender of women’s political and economic rights, was one of the very few
pamphleteers who advocated women’s suffrage in his times. Nevertheless, he has been criticized
by some historians for his patriarchal, even reactionary outlook. This article vindicates Spence’s
record on women’s rights against those interpretations, by showing that his thought developed
in the direction of gender equality. Spence, however, did not consider allowing women to access
executive functions and he was no feminist by 21st-century standards. 
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Thomas Spence défendait les droits politiques et économiques des femmes. Il était l’un des très
rares  pamphlétaires  de  son époque à  demander  le  vote  des  femmes.  Certains  historiens  ont
cependant décelé chez lui une vision patriarcale, voire rétrograde. Contre ces interprétations
anachroniques, cet article s’emploie à dégager l’évolution de la position de Thomas Spence, de
plus en plus favorable à l’égalité entre les sexes, tout en soulignant que Spence n’envisageait pas
de  confier  aux  femmes de  fonctions  exécutives  et  n’était  pas  féministe  au  sens  où  on  peut
l’entendre de nos jours.
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